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C:au.nREN-A testamentary trust required the trustee to apply income in such
amounts as might be necessary for the education, support and maintenance
of H until he attained the age of 35 years; then to hand over the corpus and
accrued interest. Contingent interests were created for children of H who
might survive his death before the age of 35. After the death of testatri.'C, H
married W and had two children. In an agreement subsequently incorporated
in a California decree of divorce obtained by W, H promised to make monthly
payments to W for her own support and for the support of his children until
distribution of the trust, and purported to assign to her his interest in the
trust income to secure this obligation. Upon W's request for payment, plaintiff
trustee sought a judgment declaratory of the effect of the assignment and the
claims of H's wife and children. On appeal, held: (1) Trustee had no right
or duty to comply with the purported assignment of income to W. The trust
was one for support from income and H could not alienate his income interest.
(2) The will of testatrix evidenced her e,.."Pectation that H might marry and
her intent that reasonable support be provided not only for H individually, but
for his family as well. Accordingly, trustee was instructed to pay from surplus
income, after providing support for H, amounts which it should consider reasonably necessary for the education, support and maintenance of his children.
(3) Trustee had no right to honor W's claim for support from the trust. Under
the terms of the !IlVorce decree she became a mere creditor unconnected with
H's family and her needs for support were not to be considered in determining
the amount necessary for H's support. Seattle First Nat. Bank v. Crospy,
(Wash. 1953) 254 P. (2d) 732.
The extent of the beneficiary's interest in a trust for support is determined
by factors personal to him, i.e., his "needs" or "requirements" for education or
support. Payment to his assignee or creditor could not satisfy his needs in
these respects and would frustrate the whole purpose of the settlor in creating
the trust.1 Thus it is commonly held, even in jurisdictions which reject the

1 Slattexy v. Wason, 151 Mass. 266, 23 N.E. 843 (1890); 1 Scon-, TRUSTS §154
(1939). This analysis would fail, of course, where the creditor has supplied the beneficiary's
needs within the trust pw:pose, i.e., provided for his support or education.
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spendthrift trust,2 that the beneficiary's interest in a trust for his support is
not alienable by him and not amenable to the demands of his creditors.3 However, it may be that a purported assignment by the beneficiary is not wholly
ineffective. In Keeler's Estate4 it was held that an attempted assignment of
the beneficial interest in a trust for support operated as a revocable order to the
trustee to pay successively accruing installments of income to the assignee,
and the trustee, although not obliged to do so, could make such payments until
the order was revoked by the beneficiary ·without incurring liability for breach
of trust.6 This result was reached on· the doubtful theory that the assignee
receives payment as the agent or representative of the beneficiary.6 If the
trustee's primary duty is not to comply with the beneficiary's orders, but to
observe the settlor's lawful restrictions on the use of trust funds under his
control, then payment to the assignee surely violates these restrictions whether
or not the beneficiary acquiesces. In giving instructions to the trustee the
court in the principal case rejected without much discussion the doctrine of
the Keeler case. Whether it would do so if the suit were one for breach of
trust is another question.
The great dispute concerning the right of dependents of the beneficiary
to share in the income from a spendthrift or support trust still continues.
Claims of the beneficiary's children for support from these types of trusts have
generally met with success either on the basis that the expressed or implied
insulation of the beneficiary against the claims of his creditors was not intended
to include his dependents,7 or, as the court in the principal case determined,
that it was the intent of the settlor to include them as beneficiaries of the
trust.8 Where the terms of the trust expressly or by reasonable construction
attempt to preclude the children of the beneficiary from enforcing their claims
for support against his interest, the courts have been driven to put their decisions
one way or another on grounds of public policy.9 The claim of the beneficiary's
2Thurber v. Thurber, 43 R.I. 504, 112 A. 209 (1921); l Scorr, TRusTs §154
(1939).
3 Holmesv. Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 A. 479 (1907); l Scorr, TRUSTS §154 (1939);
Gmswor.n, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§430 to 434.2 (1947); l TRUSTS REsTATEMENT
§154 (1935). But see Keeler's Estate, 334 Pa. 225, 3 A. (2d) 413 (1939).
4 Note 3 supra.
G Similar results were reached on the grounds of estoppel in Shuster's Estate, 26 Pa.
Dist. 232 (1917), and In re Jones Estate, 199 Pa. 143, 48 A. 865 (1901).
6 See annotation of Keeler's Estate, note 3 supra, in 121 A.L.R. 1301 (1939).
7England v. England, 223 ID. App. 549 (1922); Tuttle v. Gunderson, 254 ID. App.
552 (1929); Keller v. Keller, 284 ID. App. 198, l N.E. (2d) 773 (1936); Moorehead's
Estate, 289 Pa. 542, 137 A. 802 (1927); Thomas v. Thomas, 112 Pa. Super. 578, 172 A.
36 (1934); Marsh v. Scott, 2 N.J. Super. 240, 63 A. (2d) 275 (1949); l Scorr, TRUSTS
§157.l (1939).
SEaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 132 A. 10 (1926), noted in 35 YALE L.J. 1025
(1926); I Scorr, TRUSTS §157.l (1939). See also 148 A.L.R. 1036 (1941).
9 Sustaining dependent's claims: Keller v. Keller, note 7 supra; Thomas v. Thomas,
note 7 supra; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70 (1935); In re Sullivan's
Will, 144 Neb. 36, 12 N.W. (2d) 148 (1944); Cogswell v. Cogswell, 178 Ore. 417, 167
P. (2d) 324 (1946). See also Bank of Beaumont v. Howard, 149 Te."<. 130, 229 S.W.
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wife has been similarly treated.10 But there is considerable authority for the
view that the separated wife or divorcee is a mere contract claimant.11 Much
depends in a given jurisdiction upon whether alimony or a support claim is
regarded as a mere debt or continuation of the social obligation assumed in
matrimony.12 The court in the principal case observed that by the terms of the
divorce decree, W had released all marital property rights
relegated herself to
the position of a creditor. However, its conclusion that she had thereby "waived
any possibility of urging ••. the appealing equities which have led many courts
to invade a spendthrift or support trust for the maintenance of a divorced
wife''13 is doubtful as a matter of policy and contrary to better reasoned
decisions.14

and
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(2d) 781 (1950). Contra: Erickson v. Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, 266 N.W. 161, 267 N.W.
426 (1936); Schwager v. Schwager, (7th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 754; San Diego TIUSt
& Savings Bank v. Heustis, 121 Cal. App. 675, 10 P. (2d) 158 (1922); In re Bucl<lin's
Estate, 243 Iowa 312, 51 N.W. (2d) 412 (1952). See 1 Scorr, TRUSTS §157.1 (1939).
10 Reynolds v. Reynolds, note 9 supra; Moorehead's Estate, note 7 supra. Cf. Schwager
v. Schwager, note 9 supra. See Eaton v. Eaton, note 8 supra. See also 10 Mn. L. RBv.
359 (1949); 93 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 207 (1944).
11 Hitchens v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore, 193 Md. 53, 66 A. (2d)
97 (1949); Schwager v. Schwager, note 9 supra; Lippencott v. Lippencott, 349 Pa. 501,
37 A. (2d) 741 (1944). Contra: England v. England, note 7 supra; Safe Deposit & TIUSt
Co. of Baltimore v. Robertson, 192 Md. 653, 65 A. (2d) 292 (1949), noted 10 Mn. L.
R:Ev. 359 (1949); Clay v. Hamilton, 116
App. 214, 63 N.E. (2d) 207 (1945), noted
19 Ro= Mr. L. RBv. 87 (1946); 1 Scorr, TnuSTs §157.l (1939); 93 UNIV. PA. L.
R:Ev. 207 (1944).
12 2 SCHOULl!R, M.urnu.GB, Drvonm;, SEl'ARATION AND Dol\mSTic Rm.ATIONS, 6th
ed., §1754 (1921). See also 93 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 207 (1944).
1s Principal case at 744.
14 Cogswell v. Cogswell, note 9 supra; l Scorr, TRUSTS §157.1 (1939). While the
divorced wife may in a sense occupy the position of a creditor, she is a special one, for her
claim is generally not assignable or subject to garnishment and, unlike other "debts," may
be enforced by the equitable remedies of injunction, contempt, and sequestration. See 93
Umv. PA. L. REv. 207 (1944).
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